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SPANISH PENSION REFORM
Joseph A. Blair
Introduction
At some point in every person’s life, he or
she will become physically unable or unwilling
to work as a result of old age. When a person
does decide to retire, it is important that he or
she has sufficient funds to live on. One way
many countries have dealt with the financial
situation retirees face has been to introduce a
pension system. A pension plan can ensure a
comfortable retirement, as it is a payment
rewarded to a retired person in consideration
of past services. Typically, pensions are the
responsibility of the individual, the employer,
and the government. Due to recent demo-
graphic shifts in most First World countries,
however, pensions have become exceedingly dif-
ficult to finance. Spain, specifically, has been
identified as having one of the most expensive
and unstable publicly-run pension plans in the
developed world.
In this article, I first discuss the subject of
pensions in a general context. I then follow with
an explanation of the reasons behind Spain’s
unique situation. Finally, I propose several
reforms that could ameliorate and revitalize the
current Spanish pension system. Based on the
research and statistics presented in this article,
I argue that without enacting significant
reforms, Spain’s pension system may well be
headed for an economic crisis. 
Types of Pensions
There are several types of pensions that a
government may choose to adopt. Pensions can
be provided both publicly and privately, the dif-
ference being that public pensions are supplied
by the government, while private pensions are
essentially voluntary savings accounts funded
by an individual, employer, or union. Public and
private pension programs, however, are not
mutually exclusive. In other words, the gov-
ernment may encourage its citizens to fund
their own private pensions in addition to pro-
viding public pensions.
Regardless of the type of pension system
a country has adopted, all pensions are funded
by contributions and paid out in benefits.
Contributions are the necessary payments
made by a worker up until his or her retire-
ment, while benefits are the funds awarded
post-retirement. Pension plans can be calcu-
lated using either a defined contribution 
formula or a defined benefit formula.
A defined contribution formula identifies
the contribution rate, and benefits are simply
the sum of contributions amassed by a worker
upon retirement. Using this formula, an indi-
vidual’s retirement benefits are completely
dependent on his or her savings. Private pen-
sion plans usually operate according to a
defined contribution formula.
A defined benefit formula guarantees
retirement benefits, and as a result, the contri-
bution rate may fluctuate. This type of formu-
la generally operates on a pay-as-you-go basis.
On a pay-as-you-go basis, the working popula-
tion must contribute a fraction of its salary to
the retirement fund, and then the proceeds
from this fund are distributed among the cur-
rent retirees. The size of one’s pension depends
upon the number of years one has contributed
to the fund. Usually people who work longer
receive a proportionately larger pension upon
retirement. In many developed countries, pub-
lic pension plans function according to a
defined benefit formula, although every gov-
ernment has a different combination of each of
these types of pension plans and formulas. The
specifics of Spain’s pension system will be dis-
cussed further in the following section. 
Characteristics of the Spanish
Pension System
Spain’s current pension system is a pub-
licly-run pay-as-you-go plan. The official retire-
ment age is 65, with an early retirement option
at age 60. To receive benefits, an individual
must contribute to the fund for a minimum of
15 years and stop working upon retirement.
The benefit formula for the Spanish pension
plan is one of the most generous in the world,
as seen in Table 1 above, which shows the pen-
sion benefits and necessary contribution years
in several countries of similar size and wealth.
The benefits under Spain’s pension system are
comparable to those of the largest six countries
in the European Union, but the number of nec-
essary years of contribution for a full pension
is the lowest. These figures indicate that
Spanish pensioners have relatively low require-
ments to earn significant benefits.
Determining Individual Benefits
The monthly pension (Pt) that a Spanish
retiree will receive is calculated by multiplying
a regulatory base (Bt) by a replacement rate
(rn). Equation 1 shows this relationship.
1
Pt = Bt*rn (1)
The regulatory base (Bt) is a weighted
average of monthly earnings in the 15 years
immediately before retirement. Equation 2
shows how a regulatory base is calculated,
where Wt-j and It-j represent monthly earnings
and the consumer price index in the jth month
before retirement, respectively. 
(2)
Table 1
Pension Benefits and Necessary Contribution Years in 2000 
for 7 Developed Countries
Country Percent of Former Income for the Average Contribution Years for a 
Earner with a Full Contribution Record Full Pension
France 70 38.5
Germany 70 45
Italy 70 35
Poland 61 37.5
Spain 65 35
U.K. 38 44
Source: Peaple, p. 11.
1Source of all equations: Boldrin and Jiménez-Martín.
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The monthly payment is averaged over 15 years;
hence, the sum total of contributions is divid-
ed by 180 months. The replacement rate (rn)
for a person above the age of 65 depends on n,
the number of years he or she has contributed
to the fund. Equation 3 shows the specifics of
this relationship.
(3)
An individual who retires at the age of 65 and
contributes to the fund for more than 35 years
receives 100 percent of the regulatory base. He
or she would receive 80 percent for contribut-
ing for exactly 25 years. Even if this same indi-
vidual were to only contribute for the bare min-
imum of 15 years, he or she would still receive
approximately 50 percent of the regulatory
base. 
Due to this generous system, an amend-
ment was enacted in 2002 that provides an
incentive for people to continue working past
the retirement age of 65. This amendment was
an attempt to increase the number of contrib-
utors to the pension fund and decrease the
number of pensioners. Before this legislation,
no such incentive to postpone retirement exist-
ed. According to the 2002 amendment, the
replacement rate is subject to Equation 4,
assuming the retiree is above the age of 65 and
has contributed for over 35 years, where a rep-
resents the retirement age.
rn = 1+.02(a – 65), if a ≥ 65 and n ≥ 35 (4)
Working past the age of 65 earns the retiree a
replacement rate that is above 100 percent,
which means that a retiree could effectively
receive a monthly pension greater than the
value of his regulatory base. For example, if a
Spanish citizen were to work until age 75, he
or she would receive 102 percent of his regula-
tory base.
Despite the recent incentive for late retire-
ment, early retirement is still culturally accept-
able and popular. Spanish citizens may opt for
an early retirement between the ages of 60 and
64; however, this option places a penalty on
their regulatory base. Equation 5 shows that
the replacement rate is reduced by 8 percent
for each year under age 65, where a represents
the retirement age.
(5)
The purpose of Equation 5 is to implement fea-
tures that discourage workers from retiring
early. For example, an individual who chooses
to retire at the age of 60 will receive 60 percent
of his or her regulatory base. Likewise, a per-
son who decides to retire at age 64 will receive
92 percent. In both 1997 and 2002, this equa-
tion was modified slightly to decrease penalties
against retirees with longer contribution
records, providing them with a larger percent-
age of their regulatory base than they would
otherwise receive. 
The benefit formula discussed above
applies to the general population but is modi-
fied for certain professions. For example, farm-
ers, government workers, and the self-
employed have slightly more generous
formulas to calculate their pensions. Special
legislation also rewards higher benefits to bull-
fighters and employees of the transportation
industries, such as railroads and airlines.
In addition to the benefit formulas already
mentioned, there are also defined maximum
and minimum pensions. The maximum allow-
able pension roughly corresponds to 4.3 times
the minimum wage or approximately 1.6 times
the average monthly earnings in the manufac-
turing and service sectors. (Boldrin and
Jiménez-Martín, p. 6) A person with a calculat-
ed pension above this ceiling will be paid no
more than the maximum.
On the other hand, if a person’s calculat-
ed pension is below a certain level, a minimum
pension is paid by the government. The mini-
mum allowable pension is legislated annually.
The ratio between the minimum old-age pen-
sion and minimum wage has been increasing
steadily from the late 1970s. In 1975 it was
approximately 75 percent, whereas in 1990 it
reached nearly 100 percent. (Boldrin and
Jiménez-Martín, p. 6) Between 1990 and 2000,
minimum pensions increased at approximate-
ly the same rate as nominal wages, whereas
maximum pensions grew at the rate of infla-
rn =
0, if n < 15
.5 + .03 (n – 15), if 15 ≤ n < 25,
.8 + .02 (n – 25), if 25 ≤ n < 35,
1, if 35 ≤ n.{
rn =
0, if a < 60,
.6 + .8 (a – 60), if 60 ≤ a < 65,
1, if 65 ≤ a.{
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tion. The implications of these figures can only
be fully understood by comparing the costs of
Spain’s expensive pension system with those of
other large First World countries.
Cost of Public Pensions
Spain’s generous pension scheme is fund-
ed exclusively by contributions from the work-
ing population, including both employers and
employees. Table 2 shows the percentage of the
average earner’s salary put toward the public
pension system for several European countries
that are of similar size and wealth as Spain.
Spain’s total contribution rate to the pension
system, 28.3 percent, is slightly below that of
Italy, but higher than that of every other coun-
try shown. Clearly, Spanish workers contribute
to this costly program in hope of earning sim-
ilar benefits in the future. Another notable sta-
tistic is that Spain has the largest employer-to-
employee contribution ratio. Spain’s employers
are paying the second highest rate, at 23.6 per-
cent; however, employees are paying a much
lower rate than any other country in the table,
at 4.7 percent. While economic theory suggests
that the burden of the employee’s share of the
payroll tax falls on the employee, it may be that
the extraordinarily high tax rate on the employ-
er creates an illusion for Spanish employees
that the pension system is relatively inexpen-
sive. An average Spanish employee will only see
a 4.7 percent salary tax for the pension pro-
gram, oblivious to the immense 23.6 percent
tax on the employer, which more accurately
reflects the true costs of the pension system. 
The Spanish government attempts to sat-
isfy both pensioners, by supplying generous
benefits, and employees, by demanding mini-
mal contributions, but at the expense of the
employers and the economy. To illustrate this
point, Table 3 shows estimates of the cost of
public pension systems in several European
countries as a percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). The figures for 2000 make Spain’s
pension program seem affordable, having the
second lowest expenditure at 9.4 percent.
However, the projections for 2050 indicate that
Spain will have the highest percentage of any
country in the Table, at 17.3 percent. The
Spanish pension system is expected to practi-
cally double in cost by the year 2050, and
experts widely agree that Spain is currently in
a dire situation compared to other developed
countries.
In 2003 the Center for Strategic and
Table 2
Contributions to Compulsory Pensions (Percent of Salary of Average Earner)
France Germany Italy Poland Spain U.K.
Employer 15.46–15.6 9.75 24 9.8 23.6 7.3
Employee 9.75–10.35 9.75 9 9.8 4.7 6.2
Total 25–26 19.5 33 19.6 28.3 13.5  
Source: Peaple, p. 12.
Table 3
Estimates of State Pension Expenditure (Percent of GDP)
2000 2050
France 12.1 15.8
Germany 11.8 16.9
Italy 13.8 14.1
Poland 10.8 8.3
Spain 9.4 17.3
U.K. 5.5 4.4
EU-15 10.2 13.5
Source: Peaple, p. 4.
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International Studies (CSIS) published the
Aging Vulnerability Index as part of its Global
Aging Initiative, which evaluates and ranks the
vulnerability of First World countries to finan-
cial problems resulting from rising old-age
dependency costs. These ratings are based on
each country’s history, culture, and projected
future economic state. The index assessed 12
countries and grouped them into three cate-
gories: low, medium, and high vulnerability
groups. Spain was placed in the high, or most
vulnerable, group. In fact, Table 4 shows that
within this group, Spain ranked as the most
vulnerable of all 12 countries. The rankings are
based on the following four categories of indi-
cators: public burden, fiscal room, benefit
dependence, and elder affluence. The public
burden indicators track the amount of total
public spending of each country.2 The fiscal
room indicators rate the ability of the govern-
ment to increase benefits to the elderly through
increasing social security taxes, cutting taxes
in other areas, or public borrowing.3 The ben-
efit dependence indicators analyze how depen-
dent the elderly are on public benefits and thus
how politically difficult it would be to reduce
government spending.4 Lastly, the elder afflu-
ence indicators evaluate the influence the elder-
ly population carry with the younger genera-
tions.5 Spain ranked poorly with respect to all
four categories, especially with the public bur-
den indicators, as a result of its generous pen-
sion scheme. Clearly, Spain’s pension system
may be headed for an economic breakdown
unless effective reform is initiated. It is there-
fore important to identify demographic trends
in Spain that could be contributing to this
potential misfortune. 
Demographic Factors
The leading factor contributing to pension
problems in Spain is its unfavorable demo-
graphics. The aging of the general population
is a growing problem because it results in an
increase in the number of people receiving pen-
Table 4
Aging Vulnerability Ranking List
Rankings From Least to Most Vulnerable
Low Vulnerability 1 Australia
2 U.K.
3 U.S.
Medium Vulnerability 4 Canada
5 Sweden
6 Japan
7 Germany
8 Netherlands
9 Belgium
High Vulnerability 10 France
11 Italy
12 Spain
Source: Howe and Jackson, p. iii.
2The Public Burden Category includes 3 indicators: pub-
lic benefits to the elderly in 2040 as a percent of GDP, the
growth from 2000 to 2040 in public benefits to the elderly
as a percent of GDP, and public benefits to the elderly in
2040 as a percent of the income of the non-elderly.
3The Fiscal Room Category includes 3 indicators: total
taxes as a percent of GDP in 2040, total benefits to the elder-
ly in 2040 as a percent of total government outlays, and the
year that the new government debt reaches 150 percent of
GDP.
4The Benefit Dependence Category includes 3 indicators:
public benefits as a percent of after-tax elderly income in
2040, the percent of the elderly who live with their adult
children, and the percent of the elderly who would drop
below the poverty line if public benefits were cut by 10 per-
cent.
5The Elder Affluence Category includes 2 indicators: the
ratio of per capita income of the elderly to per capita income
of the non-elderly in 2040, and the percentage change in
that ratio between 2000 and 2040.
Figure 1
Number of Elderly (Over Age 60) as a Percent of the Population
Source: Howe and Jackson, p. 1.
sions and a decrease in the number of workers
contributing. Figure 1 shows the percentages
of elderly people in the populations of 12 First
World countries.
Spain’s elderly class, while a modest 22.0
percent of the population in 2000, is expected
to double in percentage by 2040. Spain’s pro-
jected elderly population percentage in 2040,
at 45.5 percent, is the highest of all the coun-
tries listed except Italy. The dependency ratio
(i.e., the number of people over the age of 60 as
a percent of the working population) measures
the strain put on the workforce to support the
retired population. Table 5 contains dependen-
cy ratios for several similar European countries,
as well as the European Union average. In 2000,
Spain’s dependency ratio was close to the EU
average; however, in 2050 it is projected to be
the highest of all the countries, except again for
Italy. These predictions show that action must
be taken to prevent a potentially severe loss of
retirement benefits.
Spain’s forecasts, while more gloomy than
those of other countries, follow the general
trend of aging populations in First World coun-
tries. Increased life expectancy in developed
Table 5
Dependency Ratios: Elderly Population as a Percent 
of the Working Population
2000 2050
France 24.4 46
Germany 23.8 49
Italy 26.6 61
Poland 20.4 55.2
Spain 24.5 60
U.K. 23.8 42
EU-15 24.2 49
Source: Peaple, p. 4.
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U.S.
Australia
Canada
U.K.
France
Netherlands
Belgium
Germany
Sweden
Japan
Spain
Italy
16.3%
26.0%
16.6%
30.1%
17.0%
33.3%
20.8%
33.9%
20.6%
35.0%
18.5%
35.5%
22.2%
36.1%
23.5%
37.4%
22.8%
37.5%
23.9%
44.7%
22.0%
45.5%
24.4%
46.2%
2000
2040
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countries is a result of advances in medical
technology and pharmacology. In Spain’s case,
between 1950 and 2000 the life expectancy for
males increased from 61.60 to 75.35 years and
for females from 66.30 to 82.25 years. (“Spain”)
The consequent lengthening of the average
retirement period is one of the main reasons
that Spain’s government is having trouble pro-
viding benefits for all pensioners. When the
original legislation was passed, few people actu-
ally lived past the retirement age.
Another problematic demographic trend
is the decrease in Spain’s fertility rate over the
last few decades. The fertility rate, or average
number of children per woman, dropped from
2.89 in 1960 to 1.13 in 2000. (“Spain”) Spain
now has one of the lowest fertility rates in the
EU and, in fact, the world. Table 6 demonstrates
fertility rate projections for the year 2050 for
various First World countries.
Notice in this table that Spain’s projected
fertility rate is the lowest of all the countries
listed, except for Italy. This statistic can be
attributed to the relatively new trend of Spanish
women entering the workforce. The average
maternity age in Spain, or average age when a
woman gives birth to her first child, is also one
of the highest in the EU and has been steadily
increasing. The situation has become so
extreme that the ruling socialist party (PSOE)
led by Jose Zapatero, which was elected in
March 2004, passed legislation to “extend
monthly payments of 100 euro per child to non-
working mothers to encourage them to breed.”
(“The Second Transition...,” p. 10) The combi-
nation of Spain’s low fertility rate and high
average maternity age results in a decrease in
the number of young workers contributing to
the pension fund, and thus depletes the bene-
fits available to support future retirees.
Despite the gloomy outlook for Spain’s
pension system, there are several unique demo-
graphic factors that could provide some opti-
mism for the future. For instance, most
Spanish citizens have close ties with their reli-
gion and their family. Often children will live
with their parents until they get married.
Moreover, it is not uncommon for parents to
live with their children as they get older, instead
of entering retirement communities. Figure 2
shows the percent of elderly people (over the
age of 60) living with their adult children for
12 First World countries. Spaniards tend to take
care of their parents in old age. As shown, 40.5
percent of the Spanish elderly class live with
their adult children, the third highest percent-
age of all the countries listed in the table. For
this reason, Spain can take some comfort in
knowing that its elderly would be supported by
their children if their benefits were to be
reduced. This is important since many elderly
Table 6
Projected Fertility Rates of First World Countries in 2050
Fertility Rate6
Australia 1.8
Belgium 1.5
Canada 1.6
France 1.7
Germany 1.3
Italy 1.2
Japan 1.4
Netherlands 1.5
Spain 1.2
Sweden 1.5
U.K. 1.7
U.S. 2.0
Source: Howe and Jackson, p. 12.
6The CSIS demographic scenario is based on the UN’s
latest “constant fertility” scenario until the year 2050, which
assumes that rates of fertility (in all countries) and net immi-
gration (in most countries) will continue at their 1995–2000
averages.
Figure 2
Percent of the Elderly (Over Age 60) Living with Their Adult Children7
Source: Howe and Jackson, p. 15.
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people would face financial difficulties if the
pension system were to change. Figure 3 shows
the percentage increase in the number of elder-
ly, meaning those over the age of 60, who would
fall below the poverty line following an imme-
diate 10 percent cut in public benefits. The 10
percent figure is arbitrary, one that simulates
a relatively drastic cut in benefits that a gov-
ernment might initiate in times of economic
turmoil. A person living in poverty is defined as
one who lives in a household with an income
that is less than 50 percent of the national aver-
age household income. As shown in Figure 3,
Spain is estimated to have only 3.9 percent of
its elderly population pushed into poverty
assuming this hypothetical scenario, which is
the fourth lowest of the 12 countries repre-
sented. This can be attributed to Spain’s already
generous benefit plan as well as strong family
values.
The state of the economy in Spain is also
a contributing factor to the pension problem.
One way to evaluate the health of a nation’s
economy is to examine its unemployment rate.
In 2004, the national unemployment rate in
Spain was estimated to be 11.3 percent.
(“Financial and Social Rankings...”) With fewer
people employed, less money is contributed to
the public pension fund. Another contributing
factor to the suffering economy and the result-
ing pension problem is that students usually
spend 5–6 years studying at a university and, in
effect, delay entering the workforce. This fur-
ther hinders the growth of the contributory
fund. In addition, strict job security laws make
it difficult for many people, especially young
adults, to gain employment. For example, it is
exceedingly difficult for employers to terminate
a Spanish employee; therefore, the incentive to
hire new full-time employees is low. Part-time
employment in Spain has increased from 
4.7 percent of total employment in 1991 to 
7.9 percent in 2002. Temporary work repre-
sented 31 percent of total employment in 2002,
the highest rate in the European Union.
(“Reform of the Spanish Pension System”) This
structure of employment provides security for
current employees, yet prevents opportunity for
new employees, thereby stifling economic
growth. Spain’s troubled economy clearly exac-
erbates its fragile pension situation; and while
many experts recognize this problem, most
politicians are hesitant to propose a solution.
7Specifically, the indicator measures the share of all
elderly who now live in extended families with their adult
children, whether the parents live in their grown children’s
household or — what is much more common in most coun-
tries — the grown children live in their parents’ household.
Japan
Italy
Spain
Canada
Australia
Belgium
U.S.
Germany
U.K.
France
Netherlands
Sweden
*Data refer to latest year available, generally in mid-1990s.
50.4%
42.1%
40.5%
20.3%
19.5%
15.6%
15.1%
13.7%
13.0%
12.4%
9.1%
5.0%
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Politics
Politics play a significant role in current
pension policy as well as in reform proposals.
Individual parties hold differing positions on
pension reform. Historically, the left wing
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE), the
Spanish Socialist Workers Party, defends the
pay-as-you-go system. The PSOE is the party
that won the election in March 2004. The trade
unions have also continually backed the cur-
rent pay-as-you-go system. These two groups
have traditionally supported the policy of alter-
ing the contributory rate to maintain defined
benefits.
The right wing Partido Popular (PP), or
Popular Party, has generally supported a mix of
the current system with privatization.
Employers have also historically endorsed this
mixed system, because the pay-as-you-go sys-
tem is extremely costly for them. They argue
that their high contribution rate hinders the
creation of new employment opportunities.
(Cabrero, p. 8) 
Regardless of these two positions, right or
left, very few politicians promote modifying the
current system because of how politically
unpopular a change would be with the general
population. Few Spaniards are willing to give
up their generous retirement check, despite the
adverse effects it may have on the economy.
This slow deterioration of Spain’s economy and
pension system will only become worse unless
significant reforms are enacted, as will be dis-
cussed in the following section.
Proposed Solutions
Many Spanish citizens would recommend
maintaining the current pay-as-you-go system.
Based on demographic projections, however,
the only way this system can support itself is by
either increasing the contributory payroll tax
or by decreasing benefits to pensioners.
Considering how high the payroll tax is cur-
rently, raising it still higher is unrealistic. On
the other hand, decreasing benefits to pen-
sioners would meet fierce opposition from cur-
rent and future pensioners alike. Despite oppo-
sition for change, it is evident that the current
system cannot and will not support itself indef-
initely.
Another option available to Spain is to
raise the retirement age. This action would
effectively increase the population of contribu-
tors and decrease the population of pensioners.
The same logic applies when considering
increasing the minimum number of years of
Figure 3
Percent of the Elderly (Over Age 60) Pushed into Poverty by a 
10 Percent Cut in Public Benefits
Source: Howe and Jackson, p. 16.
2.0%
2.9%
2.9%
3.9%
3.9%
4.0%
4.1%
4.5%
4.9%
5.2%
5.2%
5.7%
Japan
Italy
U.S.
Spain
Canada
Australia
U.K.
Sweden
Netherlands
France
Belgium
Germany
*Poverty threshold is 50 percent of the median income for all households
in each country; income excludes government health care benefits;
data refer to latest year available, generally in mid-1990s.
Figure 4
Private Pension Benefits, as a Percent of GDP
Source: Howe and Jackson, p. 16.
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contribution. Raising the minimum number of
contributory years from 15 to 20, for example,
would decrease the number of people eligible
to receive pensions and increase the incentive
to stay in the workforce for a longer period of
time. Both of these actions are also politically
dangerous, because of the predisposition of
most Spanish citizens. 
Implementing a more flexible retirement
policy is another option that could revitalize
Spain’s pension system. More specifically, the
government could provide further incentives
for people over 65 to continue working. The
2002 amendment was a step in this direction;
however, the increase in benefits for those who
postpone retirement is small and not worth the
extra years of employment to most Spaniards.
If the benefit formulas were more generous,
people would be more likely to remain in the
workforce. People over the age of 65 could con-
tinue to earn salary, extend their contribution
record, and collect a larger pension later.
Enabling the elderly to postpone their retire-
ment and rewarding them highly for it could
increase the size of the contributory fund sig-
nificantly.
Promoting more private pension saving is
another viable option. Currently, Spain has very
few private pension plans relative to other com-
parable nations. Figure 4 outlines the private
pension spending of the same 12 First World
countries mentioned earlier, as a percent of
GDP. As of the year 2000, Spain had the lowest
percentage of spending on private pension ben-
efits, except for France, at 0.2 percent. Spain’s
projected percentage of spending in 2040 is
again the second lowest, at 3.1 percent. These
figures show that Spaniards rely wholeheart-
edly on the government to provide them with
social security as a result of their steady con-
tribution record. By implementing more
mandatory private pension spending, the coun-
try could, in effect, relieve some of the stress
put on the public system in the future. 
While most European countries have pub-
licly-run pension systems with a defined bene-
fit formula, other countries have developed pri-
vatized pension systems with a defined
Australia
Japan
U.K.
Canada
Netherlands
U.S.
Sweden
Italy
Belgium
Germany
Spain
France
*Includes all employer pensions, personal pensions, and
severance pay schemes.
2000
2040
0.1%
0.3%
3.1%
0.2%
3.4%
0.9%
3.6%
1.7%
4.3%
1.3%
5.3%
2.2%
7.4%
3.6%
8.2%
3.3%
8.5%
3.2%
8.9%
3.6%
9.2%
3.1%
11.1%
2.5%
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contribution formula. For example, Chile has
had noteworthy success with its pension 
system since introducing private pension poli-
cies in 1981. Chilean workers with full-time
employment are required to contribute
between 10 and 20 percent of their monthly
salary into their own personal private pensions.
(“Chile’s Private Pension System”) At the
request of the individual, the funds in his or her
pension may be invested by a pension firm or
simply saved, as in a bank account. In 2005,
Chilean private pension spending was estimat-
ed to be worth over 30 billion dollars. (“Chile
Reference Information...”) One problem with
implementing this system is the large fixed
costs associated with the transition from the
old system to the new system. In Chile, the gov-
ernment issues “recognition bonds” to workers
who wish to switch to the new system in order
to recognize their contributions made to the
old system. (“Chile’s Private Pension System”)
These bonds may be cashed in by the workers
upon their retirement. This method allows the
government to spread out the transition costs
over time instead of paying them all upfront. If
Spain were able to implement this type of tran-
sition, it would eliminate the impending pub-
lic pension deterioration expected in the future.
In summary, increasing private pension spend-
ing today is the most practical solution to sav-
ing the benefits of retirees tomorrow.
Hope is not lost because in one important
respect, Spain is in a unique position compared
to most other countries. According to econo-
mist Franco Modigliani, a Nobel laureate, Spain
has a “window of opportunity,” because the
Spanish baby boom occurred much later than
in most countries. (Modigliani and Muralidhar,
p. 178) Therefore, a limited time frame, or
“window,” to implement reform still exists. If
the government takes steps to implement the
recommended reforms, the pension program
could become sustainable before the baby boom
generation enters retirement. Spain may not
be in imminent danger currently, but the price
of doing nothing is much higher than that of
enacting suitable reforms today.
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